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The Labour Party and Strategic Bombing in the Second World War
1
 
 
The Second World War had a central role in the history of Britain’s Labour 
Party.  Broken in the formation of the National Government in 1931, and 
worsted in the two subsequent elections, its decision to enter a wartime 
coalition under Winston Churchill brought with it the role of full partner in the 
state.  The experience culminated in the Party’s epochal success in the 1945 
general election, a victory that was held to have been the consequence of its 
concentration on domestic policy planning, and in promising the public a 
welfarist post-war settlement.  It has almost been assumed that Labour was not 
involved in the strategic or operational conduct of the war, including what was 
the first, became the longest-standing, and has remained the most 
controversial, aspect of Britain’s waging of war: strategic, area, or 
‘obliteration’ bombing. The disposition of what some maintained was – or 
should be – an internationalist party of working people towards the mass 
killing of civilians has not been considered before; whether the Party approved 
of the policy, or how far it merely had other, more pressing – it may have felt – 
priorities. Such an examination illustrates ‘labourism’ in the war, and, in its 
ambivalence towards Europe and Europeans, also perhaps afterwards. 
 
If bombing has come to signify for the Second World War what trenches have for the 
First, it has also come to acquire a similarly significant historiography.
2
  The allied (but 
                                                          
1
 A version of this article was delivered at the Annual British Scholar Conference, University of 
Texas at Austin, 1 April 2011. The author is grateful for comments offered there, to the 
anonymous readers for Labour History Review, to the editors for the invitation, and to one in 
particular for the managing of its delivery. 
2
 The simile is Daniel Swift‟s, in Bomber County: the Lost Airmen of World War Two (London 
2010).  There are too many publications to mention here, but of particular value to the present 
research: Mark Connelly, „Britain and the Debate over RAF Bomber Command‟s Role in the 
Second World War‟, Historische Literatur, 2:2 (2004), 6-17; Aaron Goldman, „Germans and 
Nazis: the Controversy over „Vansittartism‟ in Britain during the Second World War‟, Journal of 
Contemporary History, 14:1 (1979), 155-191, 156; Brett Holman, „The Air Panic of 1935: British 
Press Opinion between Disarmament and Rearmament‟, Journal of Contemporary History, 46:2 
(2011), 288-307; Brett Holman, „World Police for World Peace: British Internationalism and the 
Threat of a Knock-out Blow from the Air, 1919-1945‟, War in History, 17:3 (2010), 313-332; 
Tami Davis Biddle, „Dresden 1945: Reality, History, and Memory‟, The Journal of Military 
History, 72:2 (2008), 413-449. 
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predominantly British and American) strategic bombing campaigns against the axis 
powers (but particularly Germany), were served first by a memoir literature, then by a 
variety of operational as well as official studies.  As the combatant generation passed, 
the related issues of the efficacy and the morality of the policy came to predominate.  
The positions of defenders – latterly less numerous – and of critics – at the time and 
subsequently – have been well served.  There remain gaps in the literature, however, 
one being that of the Labour Party.  It was fully integrated into government – indeed, 
was disproportionately well represented given its denuded parliamentary status – and its 
leader was appointed deputy Prime Minister.  The gap is effectively doubled by the near 
total absence of any mention of strategic bombing in the historiography of the Party – a 
disproportionately significant omission considering the importance of the war in its 
evolution and legend.
3
  For Labour, the implication is, the war was a domestic affair. 
The subject of Labour and bombing involves both the higher direction of the war 
effort, and popular engagement with it, and so reflects the high and low aspects (and no 
subject can lend itself more readily to that bifurcation than strategic bombing).  It also 
concerns the moral dimension.  The subject is the more piquant given that Labour, an at 
least notionally internationalist party of working people, was complicit in what was, 
effectively, the indiscriminate killing of civilians, the majority of whom could be 
deemed to be workers in what was deemed by some to be an imperialist war.  Indeed, 
insofar as the bombing was targeted, it actually targeted working people, as it was they 
who lived near to their places of work or manufacture, the ostensible objectives.  That 
internationalist party in the post-war period moreover contained many for whom the 
atomic bomb was a crime against nature, and yet its leaders were complicit in the only 
                                                          
3
 The subject is not mentioned at all in the two monographs concerned with Labour and the war 
(Stephen Brooke, Labour’s War: The Labour Party during the Second World War (Oxford 1992); 
T. D. Burridge, British Labour and Hitler’s War (London 1976)), although nor for that matter are 
any explicitly military measures; nor in essay form: Ian Taylor, „Labour and the Impact of War, 
1939-45‟, in Nick Tiratsoo (ed.), The Attlee Years, London 1991, 7-28; Steven Fielding, 
„Labourism in the 1940s‟, Twentieth Century British History, 3:2 (1992), 138-153.  The 
autobiographies, biographies, and party histories similarly concern themselves with other aspects 
of the war, as does the journal literature: Jerry Brookshire, „„Speak for England‟, Act for England: 
Labour‟s Leadership and British National Security under the Threat of War in the Late 1930s‟, 
European History Quarterly, 29:2 (1999), 251-287; Mark Minion, „Left, Right or European? 
Labour and Europe in the 1940s: The case of the Socialist Vanguard Group‟, European Review of 
History: Revue Europeenne d’Histoire, 7:2 (2000), 229-248; Andrew Chandler, „The Church of 
England and the Obliteration Bombing of Germany in the Second World War‟, English Historical 
Review, 108:429 (1993), 920-946. 
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aggressive uses of those weapons, and shortly thereafter chose to build Britain‟s own.  
The position of the Party brings into question not only matters of policy and statecraft, 
but also values and culture, and of the movement of which it was the parliamentary 
wing; questions such as whether it cared less for internationalism and class solidarity 
than it did for hegemony, nationalism, and even racialism.  It is perforce as much an 
attitudinal as an institutional history.
4
 
 
The former and future Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, had framed the debate in 1932 
when he spoke of the „fear of the air‟, in reply to Labour‟s Deputy Leader, Clement 
Attlee, in a House of Commons debate on defence spending, and warned most vividly 
that one type of weapon „would always get through‟.5  Attlee agreed.6  As Leader after 
1935, his, and the Party‟s, position, was, as in other external matters, broadly 
collectivist.  Attlee‟s predecessors, Arthur Henderson and George Lansbury, had been 
active on that subject at the League of Nations Disarmament Conference from 1932 to 
1934.  The Party had supported an Air Pact and had pledged, in the last election before 
the war, to „propose to other nations the complete abolition of all national air forces.‟7  
Yet it also, as in other areas, urged the Government to spend more and achieve parity 
with Germany, Hugh Dalton foremost.
8
  In October 1938 Dalton was told of Germany‟s 
extensive anti-aircraft provision and how “London is defended at most by about 100 
guns”, and how Britain “is a wonderful target.  God could not have helped Hitler more.  
Enemy planes crossing North Sea make landfall anywhere and then go straight in to 
inland objectives.”9  Philip Noel-Baker, achieving prominence as a warrior against the 
arms trade generally, heightened the need by highlighting the impossibility of defence 
                                                          
4
 Though organisational records have been consulted, in the absence, as will be seen, of formal 
discussion of the policy of strategic bombing, the press has assumed a significant role as a record 
and channel of opinion. 
5
 House of Commons Debates [HCDebs], 10 November 1932, vol. 270, cols. 525-641. 
6
 Clement Attlee, War Comes to Britain (London 1940), 74. 
7
 1935 Labour Party General Election Manifesto, 3. 
8
 Hugh Dalton, Government’s Air Muddle Exposed (London 1938); The Fateful Years: Memoirs 
1931-1945 (London 1957), 165-170. 
9
 „Talk with two Air Force Officers‟, 25 October 1938, Hugh Dalton papers, British Library of 
Political and Economic Science, London [BLPES], II/4/1/21-22. 
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against the airborne delivery of what would later be called weapons of mass 
destruction.
10
   
Just as the air had become the most feared battlefield of a future war, so it was 
thought to be the only means actually of participating.  Contrary to Lansbury‟s 
disposition – and Ernest Bevin most certainly was contrary – the Party was keen to 
make clear that it „has never stood for pacifism and non-resistance‟.11  Bob Williams, 
the Daily Herald’s leader writer, warned Dalton that Labour should “be pulling its 
weight again in British foreign policy ... either you fight the Germans: or you surrender 
to the Germans.”12  As untroubled by cost implications as Labour‟s pre-war 
recommendations were, the air fulfilled two other requirements.  Its use was relatively 
affordable, hence the Royal Air Force‟s pioneering work in the bombing of, inter alios, 
Mesopotamia, Waziristan, Kurdistan, Transjordan, Afghanistan, Burma, Yemen, in the 
interwar period; and it fulfilled a role for Labour before 1939 not unlike the navy had 
for the Liberals before 1914 in militating against substantial land forces.  Dalton 
reminded the public that Labour had „working for a world-wide agreement to get rid of 
all bombing aircraft everywhere‟,13 but strategic bombing as a doctrine was supported 
by Frederick Montague, Under Secretary in the Air Ministry in the last Labour 
government, who claimed that by requiring no foreign bases, and therefore no foreign 
alliances, long-range bombers were actually consistent with an internationalist foreign 
policy; Lord Thomson, Montague‟s departmental chief, agreed.14  Dalton was urged to 
press on the Prime Minister increased aircraft production, even employing Italian 
suppliers.
15
  The government, appeasing the Treasury more than it satisfied service 
departments, prioritised defence over offence: fighters were cheaper than bombers. 
When war came, Labour announced a policy of „constructive opposition‟ – and 
the ILP announced that, thereby, „Britain becomes a military dictatorship.‟16 Britain‟s 
                                                          
10
 Philip Noel-Baker MP, „Notes on chemical attacks and air raid precautions‟, Noel-Baker Papers, 
Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge [CAC], NBKR/3/236. 
11
 Labour Party Archives [LPA], People‟s History Museum, Manchester, „NEC [National 
Executive Committee] minutes and papers‟, [NEC] „Disloyal attacks on the party‟, 25 January 
1940, by J. S. Middleton and G. R. Shepherd  [66d, f. 15-16]. 
12
 Robert Williams to Dalton, 20 October 1938, Dalton papers, II4/1/18-19. 
13
 The Listener, 22 February 1940, 1. 
14
 HCDebs 18 March 1930, 236:2046-7; House of Lords Debates [HLDebs], 10 March 1926, 
63:528-37; 9 April 1930, 77:48-52. 
15
 Stokes to Dalton, 28 July 1938, Dalton papers, II/4/1/8-9. 
16
 The New Leader, September 1939. 
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grand strategy, as Tribune put it, was essentially to defend the island, and „[t]he only 
offensive operations possible against the Nazis, inside this plan, were the strategic 
bombing raids against German territory‟.17  Patrick Gordon Walker, fresh from not 
contesting the Oxford by-election, observed that „Hitler has helped to obscure the 
difference between Labour‟s foreign policy and the Government‟s.‟18  The German 
Chancellor also helped obscure the difference as it related to domestic politics.  Winston 
Churchill created a new government with sixteen Labour ministers, topped by a five-
man war Cabinet in which sat Attlee and Arthur Greenwood, to be supplemented, three 
months later, with Bevin.
19
  The Party was centrally henceforth involved and „has 
decided that it must give its help to defeat the Nazi aggressor‟.20  By chance, in the same 
National Executive Committee meeting that reported Bevin‟s invitation to join the War 
Cabinet, Lansbury‟s memorial service was announced.21 
 
The Coalition was formed on 10 May 1940, a Friday, and Britain‟s strategic bombing 
offensive began on the Saturday.  In the first War Cabinet Attlee had said „the moment 
had come when it was essential that we should counter-attack‟, and an „attack on 
German railways and oil refineries seemed to provide the best means of doing this‟.22 
The Cabinet did, as if expecting future scrutiny, authorize „attacks on suitable military 
objectives‟.23  It remained the public position. „The destruction of the Axis war potential 
by air bombing is a vital and indeed major feature of our strategy‟, Attlee said in May 
1943, „and neither the enemy nor anyone else will divert us from it.‟24  By then Attlee 
was Deputy Prime Minister, and stood in as Chair of both the Cabinet and the Defence 
Committee during Churchill‟s frequent absences.  Labour‟s ministerial responsibility for 
the air war was limited to two Parliamentary Secretaries at the Ministry of Aircraft 
Production: Montague and Ben Smith, based for most of his time in the United States.
25
  
                                                          
17
 Tribune, 22 August 1941, 6. 
18
 P. C. Gordon Walker, „The Attitude of Labour and the Left to the War‟, Political Quarterly, 
11:1 (1940), 74-5 
19
 The London Gazette, 21 May 1940, 1. 
20
 LPA, NEC, op cit. 
21
 LPA, NEC, f. 320 E.C.18.1939-40, 12 May 1940. 
22
 War Cabinet [WC], 15 May 1940, Cabinet Papers, National Archives, Kew [NA], 
CAB/65/13/9/6-7. 
23
 WC, 15 May 1940, CAB65/13/9/8. 
24
 HCDebs, 27 May 1943, 389:1730. 
25
 Times, 6 May 1964, 16. 
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The Cabinet‟s Defence Committee determined policy; a Liberal, Sir Archibald Sinclair, 
was civilian head of the RAF as Secretary of State for Air, Sir Charles Portal was Chief 
of the Air Staff, and under him for most of the war was Sir Arthur Harris as Commander 
in Chief of Bomber Command.  The Defence Committee acted on the advice of the 
Chiefs of Staff, but, as Dalton soon came to appreciate, „[t]he Chiefs of Staff are much 
closer to the P.M. as Minister of Defence than to their political Chiefs, and much more 
influenced‟.26 
The fourth Labour member of the War Cabinet, albeit briefly, was Sir Stafford 
Cripps, as Minister of Aircraft Production from November 1942.  Cripps enhanced what 
could be called the Cabinet‟s „political heterogeneity‟;27 and was, George Strauss 
recalled, „regarded by many as the possible saviour of the country‟28  As the person 
responsible for providing the wherewithal to the RAF, the role also enabled him thereby 
to support the Soviet Union, a cause to which he largely owed his appointment.  Two 
days after Harris took over Bomber Command, and only six since he had joined the 
Government, Cripps addressed the Commons on „the question of the policy as to the 
continued use of heavy bombers and the bombing of Germany‟, and whether „the 
continued devotion of a considerable part of our effort to the building-up of this 
bombing force is the best use that we can make of our resources‟.  The policy had been 
„initiated at a time when we were fighting alone against the combined forces of 
Germany and Italy, and it then seemed that it was the most effective way in which we, 
acting alone, could take the initiative against the enemy‟; it followed that the 
government „are fully aware of the other uses to which our resources could be put, and 
the moment they arrive at a decision that the circumstances warrant a change, a change 
in policy will be made‟.29  The speech infuriated Harris, which was never difficult.  He 
also dismissed the „panacea mongers‟ such as Dalton who at the Ministry of Economic 
sought „the best economic targets for air attack‟.30  Harris was even more annoyed with 
                                                          
26
 Dalton, diary, 4 February 1941, Dalton papers, I/24/27. 
27
 Washington Post, 9 March 1942, 7. 
28
 George Strauss, autobiographical notes, Strauss Papers, CAC, STRS1/1/93. 
29
 HCDebs, 25 February 1942, 378:316-7. 
30
 Dalton to Sinclair, 24 June 1941, in Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air 
Offensive against Germany 1939-45 (London, 1961) [SAOG], I, 263; Sir Arthur Harris, Bomber 
Offensive (London 1947), 223. 
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A. V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, as he had been in the last Labour 
government, and keen to employ Bomber Command in the Battle of the Atlantic.
31
   
 
The martial bent of Labour members was not pronounced.  The first, and, for most, the 
only, experience they had of bombing was in being bombed.  The Party had given 
civilian defences considerable attention, and as in other areas made calls on the 
government irrespective of cost – more a matter of entrenchment rather than 
retrenchment – whilst at the same time ensuring that the clear class differentials became 
clearer still.
32
  With the Blitz, the reaction was practical, rather than political.  „Any 
authority which fails to take the warning from our past experience is‟, Ritchie Calder 
believed, „playing Hitler‟s game‟.33 Several prominent Labour parliamentarians were 
involved as constituency MPs, such as Herbert Morrison in Hackney, Strauss in 
Lambeth, and Alfred Salter in Bermondsey.  Air defence, homelessness, food, and the 
efficient prosecution of the war predominated as responses in London Labour‟s 
published communications; there was no mention of retribution, and reports were as 
much in sorrow as in anger: „the hideous destruction caused by bombing to the homes 
and lives of humble folk‟.34  Tribune found no calls for reprisals either in London or 
Coventry, where the effect of bombing was most emphatic.
35
  The Daily Herald went 
further than most, and then only to write over photographs of rubble that „Hitler‟s 
bombers did this to Workers‟ Homes in East London‟,36 and of the latter that „the 
Luftwaffe was striving to make Coventry a second Guernica‟.37  Though the New 
Statesman editorialised „the reprisal folly‟, a „sentimental hysteria‟,38 Mass Observation 
reported that vengeance was rarely heard from those bombed.
39
  Violet Markham, 
visiting bombed cities on behalf of the Unemployment Assistance Board, found the 
Labour politicians of Sheffield hostile to any outside body, let alone the Germans.
40
 
                                                          
31
 Dalton, diary, 28 June 1943, Dalton papers, I/28/200. 
32
 Labour Party Annual Report, [LPAR] 1939, 160. 
33
 New Statesman, 29 March 1941, 316. 
34
 The Labour Woman, October 1940, 106; The London News, October/November 1940-November 
1941, nos. 192-202. 
35
 Tribune, 22 November 1940, 6-7; 3 January 1941, 6-7. 
36
 Daily Herald, 11 September 1940, 6.   
37
 Daily Herald, 16 November 1940, 1. 
38
 New Statesman, 26 April 1941, 423.   
39
 New Statesman, 12 February 1944, 105.  
40
 „Report on a Visit to Sheffield, New Year‟s Day 1941‟, Violet Markham papers, BLPES, 8/38. 
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And yet there was relief with retaliation.  In April 1942, A. B. Austin could detect „an 
overture‟ to „a concerted theme‟: air fighting, and the „hundred British bombers are 
droning over France and Germany in a night, equal in hitting power to about 500 of the 
bombers the Germans used to send over here‟.41 
The extent to which that relief was expressly anti-German varied.  It was 
certainly one of the motivating factors of Lord Cherwell, the government‟s chief 
scientific adviser, and prominent in advocating the bombing offensive, just as it was of 
Lord Vansittart, the government‟s chief diplomatic adviser, prominent in advocating the 
criminalisation of the German people, „[t]his degradation of the human species‟.42  
„Vansittartism‟ drew condemnation from Labour as „pernicious‟.43 Victor Gollancz 
thought it a capitalist distraction,
44
 Stokes that it was likely to „rally all reasonable and 
patriotic Germans behind their government‟.45  For Margaret Cole, Vansittart‟s „series 
of remarkable misstatements‟ was a creed, and so intellectually consistent with Nazism 
itself,
46
 while R. H. S. Crossman broadcast to Germans in German that Germany was 
not the „eternal enemy‟.47  Walter Padley claimed that „the virus of race-hatred has eaten 
into the Labour leadership‟, and Vansittartism could certainly claim fellow travellers.48  
„[H]ysterical and venomous in tone‟, as it was for Dalton, „it is true in substance‟.49  
Attlee, Bevin, and Dalton were sympathetic to James Walker‟s Fight for Freedom 
group, a Vansittartistic front organisation.  Their concerns about Germany included 
more than merely a Nazi leadership cadre, and included reparations, disarmament, 
reconstruction, and re-education, though stopping short of supporting the Morgenthau 
plans, which for the New Statesman „fail in every test of commonsense‟.50  The Party 
received many enquiries as to its position on the FFF, eventually accepting Walter 
Loeb‟s freedom of expression, and that he was supported by William Gillies in the 
                                                          
41
 Daily Herald, 8 April 1942, 2. 
42
 Sir Robert Vansittart, Black Record: Germans Past and Present, (London 1941), 9; Hugh 
Berrington, „When Does Personality Make a Difference? Lord Cherwell and the Area Bombing of 
Germany‟, International Political Science Review, 10:1 (1989), 9-34. 
43
 Labour’s Northern Voice, January 1944, 6. 
44
 Victor Gollancz, Shall our Children Live or Die? A Reply to Lord Vansittart on the German 
Problem (London 1942), 117-120. 
45
 HCDebs, 8 April 1941, 370:1410. 
46
 Margaret Cole, „Truth and Politics‟, Political Quarterly, 14:3 (1940), 271. 
47
 The Listener, 15 February 1940, 341. 
48
 The New Leader, 26 June 1943, 5. 
49
 Dalton, diary, 2 February 1941, Dalton papers, I/24/26. 
50
 New Statesman, 7 October 1944, 231; Dalton, diary, 23 September 1943, Dalton papers, I/29/85. 
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International Department, but offered no official backing,
51
 prompting the Socialist 
Manifesto Against Racial Hatred in response.
52
  The 1943 Annual Conference passed a 
resolution that embodied the chauvinism of Vansittartism: „recognises that there are 
Germans who are opposed to the policy of their Government but believes that these 
Germans are in a very small minority,‟ and, „that the Nazi Government would not have 
remained in power or have been able to conduct a total war but for the support it 
received from the overwhelming mass of the German people.‟53 
The TUC subsequently repudiated the resolution.
54
 Yet fraternal feelings for the 
German socialists and social democrats sheltering in Britain were scant.  Hans Vogel as 
chairman of the SPD was treated coolly as insufficiently anti-militaristic; critics such as 
Curt Geyer, who supported the post-war occupation of Germany, more warmly.
55
  Anti-
Germanists blamed the SPD and its nationalist leanings in part for the rise of Nazism, 
and Charles Dukes, General Secretary of the Municipal and General Workers‟ Union, 
claimed he „had seen the overwhelming majority of German trade unionists go over to 
Nazism.‟56  It was a view that took little account of the way in which the Nazis had 
treated trades unionists, socialists, and communists, and „is an eloquent comment on the 
position‟, Socialist Appeal observed, „that the formerly pro-fascist and pro-Nazi 
capitalist press such as the Daily Mail and the Sunday Dispatch enthusiastically hailed 
this decision of the Labour Party Conference.‟57  „I am ashamed when I think of 
foreigners seeing it and imagining that that is the spirit of England‟, Victor Schiff told 
Noel-Baker, fearing that „Vansittartism may yet become the spirit of England‟, and 
wondering, if it were true, why the Party had collaborated with the SPD since 1933.
58
  
Nor did it encourage German workers to seek to overthrow the regime, as „the British 
workers must help them in their difficult struggle by continuing the fight for workers‟ 
power and socialism and extending the hand of friendship and comradeship to their 
                                                          
51
 NEC, E.C. 12 1942-43 NEC, 27 January 1943, f. 6; NEC International Sub Committee minutes 
and documents, 1929-41. 
52
 Socialist Commentary, October 1942, 2. 
53
 Socialist Appeal, July 1943. 
54
 Daily Herald, 11 September 1943, 2. 
55
 LPA, International Sub-Committee of the NEC, 16 February 1942, 67e/98. 
56
 Daily Herald, 18 June 1943, 3; New Statesman, 11 November 1944, 321. 
57
 Socialist Appeal, July 1943. 
58
 Victor Schiff to Noel-Baker, 16 January 1942, 6 November 1941, Noel-Baker Papers, CAC, 
NBKR/4/293. 
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German brother,‟ an idea Sir Walter Citrine found particularly hard to accept.59  „The 
terrible thing is that the class conscious workers whose normal reactions would be those 
of international class solidarity are precisely the ones whose leaders – or rather 
„misleaders‟ – are leading them down reactionary paths‟, wrote Ted Grant.60  The divide 
had Harold Laski, Noel-Baker, and Joseph Hallsworth („silent while their principles are 
traduced and outraged‟61) with Stokes, Gollancz, Cole, Noel-Baker, and Kingsley 
Martin on one side, and inter alia Attlee, Bevin, Dalton, Citrine, Walker demanding 
total victory, occupation, and even pastoralisation, on the other.
62
 
No policy was better suited to pastoralising Germany (“to destroy Germans and 
all they possess” as one civil servant put it to Harris)63, and Attlee consistently and 
explicitly advocated the collective waging of war, and with the collective support of the 
Party, which included the escalation of the bombing offensive. If dissension was an 
inevitable feature of Coalition for the Parliamentary Party – and Fenner Brockway for 
one despaired of „the manner in which the Labour Party was sacrificing its principles of 
liberty in order to support the war‟64 – it was less apparent over military matters in 
general, and bombing in particular.  Even the intelligence prepared for Churchill on 
Labour‟s policy differences and on „parliamentary incidents‟ could find nothing 
concerned with bombing.
65
  Inasmuch as Harris gave any thought to labour matters it 
was that „if the workers in aircraft factories will stop striking and taking holidays‟ more 
thousands of tons of bombs could be dropped on Germany.
66
 
James Chuter Ede, junior Education minister, identified „at least three dissident 
groups‟.67 Those who wanted to „fight the war more vigorously‟ comprised Emmanuel 
Shinwell, George Strauss, and Aneurin Bevan, who spent much of the war in Strauss‟s 
cellar.  Shinwell applauded the bombing as part of „the efforts of His Majesty‟s 
                                                          
59
 Socialist Appeal, July 1943; „Fight for Freedom Publishing Society‟, Austin Albu papers, CAC, 
box 13. 
60
 Socialist Appeal, November 1944. 
61
 The New Leader, 27 May 1944, 4-5. 
62
 Manchester Guardian, 13 December 1944, 4. 
63
 A. P. Rowe to Harris, 23 March 1943, Harris papers, Royal Air Force Archives, Hendon 
[RAFA], H36. 
64
 Fenner Brockway, Bermondsey Story: the Life of Alfred Salter (London 1949), 221. 
65
 „Labour Party Policy‟, Churchill (Chartwell) Papers, CAC, CHAR/9/188A/88. 
66
 Harris to Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, 20 September 1943 [copy], Harris papers, H35. 
67
 15 February 1942, in Labour and the Wartime Coalition: from the Diary of James Chuter Ede, 
1941-45, ed. Kevin Jefferys (London 1987), 50. 
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Government in trying to bring the war to a speedy conclusion‟.68  By contrast, the „out-
and-out pacifists‟ included Salter, Cecil Wilson, James Barr, and Rhys Davies.  Salter, 
suffering from deteriorating health and the experience of being bombed, made a 
famously poignant final Commons speech, describing „the steady moral deterioration‟ 
when [o]pen retaliation and revenge are now being advocated in the highest quarters‟ 
with the „indiscriminate bombing of women and children.‟  Where „in the early days of 
the war only strictly military targets were said to be the objectives of our Air Force, now 
we have photographs showing whole streets of working-class houses being blown sky-
high by our bombs‟.69  Where Salter achieved the respectful disagreement of his 
opponents, Davies managed to antagonise.  His accusation that Attlee was „bellicose‟ at 
the 1941 Labour Conference, produced a reception demonstrating the extent of 
sympathy within the Party.
70
  The third group were „peace by negotiation supporters‟ 
such as W. G. Cove, Sydney Silverman, and Richard Stokes, who was by far the most 
vocal, and became the leading Labour opponent of bombing; indeed the only 
parliamentarian to highlight it at all.  In the Commons, Stokes asked Attlee, in one of 
many sharp exchanges, for a „convention‟ with Germany for the cessation of the 
„contagious lunacy‟ of night bombing.71 Attlee repeatedly denied Stokes‟s claims that 
there was indiscriminate bombing,
72
 though Sinclair‟s reply to another enquiry was 
more revealing: „there has been no change of policy.‟73  Stokes was also a supporter of 
vaguely fascistic organisations, and wanted to maintain Germany as a bulwark against 
the Soviet Union;
74
 by any measure an iconoclast, and for Dalton a „fool‟.75 
The most notable assemblage was the Parliamentary Peace Aims group: eighteen 
backbenchers of whom the most noticeable were Davies and Stokes.
76
  Laski, Noel-
Baker, and Shinwell were similarly reluctant to vilify Germany or Germans, holding 
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economic grievances rather than military aggression as being the reason for the war.   
Austen Albu, Patrick Gordon Walker, and W. N. Warbey of the Socialist Clarity Group 
published in their Labour Discussion Notes a condemnation of Vansittart, as did the 
Fabian Society.
77
  „I can imagine how Goebbels rubs his hands when he hears some of 
the propaganda of our hate-mongers‟, John McNair wrote.78  Dalton also wondered 
when he heard doubts as to the bombing campaign.
79
 The most notable individual was 
Harold Laski, who was advised by one meeting that „air force victories‟ would do more 
to raise morale than a programme of nationalisation.
80
  Regarded as unrepresentative of 
party opinion in his criticism of the „paralysis of Labour members of the war Cabinet‟, 
and with expressions to expel him from the Party,
81
 Laski nevertheless maintained loyal 
addresses for American consumption, both public and presidential.
82
  None of the 
groups or individuals were, however, anything more than marginal. 
The party in the country, as represented at the annual conference, paid even less 
attention to bombing, and indeed more to civilian flying, and post-war plans for 
international air travel.
83
  Thoughts and deliberations were throughout concerned with 
domestic policy issues, as early as 1941 moving to post-war reconstruction, and in 1944 
and 1945 being preoccupied with preparations for the next general election.  The NEC 
was similarly preoccupied.  When overseas affairs were discussed they were usually 
colonial, particularly India, and when they concerned the war predominately dealt with 
Russia.  Relations with German socialist and social democrat refugees were the extent 
of notional engagement with the „enemy‟, as was the case for the Socialist Clarity 
Group.
84
  So too, for the Women‟s‟ Committee, and perhaps more surprisingly the 
International Committee, which was preoccupied with conditions, particularly political, 
in the occupied countries.  Significantly one aspect of British policy in the war which 
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did, briefly, arouse fratricidal strife was not Germany but Greece.
85
  Unlike bombing, 
Greece constituted an ideological issue. 
The defining political construction of the war in Britain was the electoral truce, 
another exigency of war that divided the leadership from the party at large, though not 
in a way that was to prove any more than mildly disruptive.
86
  For those committed to 
the war, Dalton thought, it should have been a simple matter: it should not be possible 
to support any but the Coalition candidate.
87
  Domestic issues rather than military 
doctrine were the grounds for complaints from constituency associations, or the 
motivation for members to vote against a Conservative coalition candidate in by-
elections.  One exception was King‟s Norton in May 1941, the party harmony being 
broken by an Independent Reprisal Candidate whose succinct manifesto was „Bomb 
Berlin‟, and during whose campaign „the Luftwaffe did some dark electioneering‟.88  
The government candidate duly won. During the war the Government lost thirteen by-
elections though none to candidates opposed to the war; Labour lost only one seat, 
Motherwell, occasioned by James Walker‟s death, and that to a Nationalist campaigning 
on housing and Prestwick airport.
89
 Anticipating the national verdict, Churchill asked 
Harris “I suppose that, when the election comes, I can count on the votes of most of the 
men in the Air Force?” Harris replied “No Sir, eighty percent of them will vote”.90 
Harris blamed the „political complexion‟ of his airmen in particular on the influence of 
Education Officers typical of the „underpaid “red” crowd in our National School 
teaching profession‟, with the Daily Herald and „socialist and communist organisations‟ 
prominent in support.
91
 
 
One connection, though it was rarely made explicit, between the Party and the bombing 
offensive was the second front.  It at least demonstrated the role of chance, since, as 
Tribune commented, „the British Government‟s long term planning of the war could not 
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be based on anticipating a Soviet entry into the war on Britain‟s side‟.92  It was the 
alliance with the Soviet Union with the aim of beating Germany that lay behind Labour 
advocacy of a second front as much as any doctrinal sympathies and it was maintained 
that the bombing offensive assisted the Russians; it was effectively, an „invasion from 
the sky‟.93  So too the issue of efficacy predominated over that of ethics.  Strategic 
bombing was both the official term and the intention, but in practice, through 
operational limitations as much as design, the policy undertaken was area bombing, 
which was how it was referred to in the War Cabinet, whatever was said to Stokes 
outside.
94
  In that it was, the defence could be made that it was little different from long-
practised long range artillery actions.
95
  It was also held as being the best way of 
preventing another western front of apparently futile attrition.
96
 Strategic bombing as it 
was originally envisaged, was targeted bombing, where the targets were enemy assets, 
and particularly oil, as Dalton claimed publicly, and others privately.
97
  Sir Richard 
Peirse, Harris‟s predecessor, affirmed that “complementary” to other methods of 
“material destruction” was “the attack on the people themselves … there is no 
distinction between combatant and non-combatant”.98  Operational limitations were 
revealed in the Butt Report, and on 14 February 1942 the Area Bombing Directive was 
issued, targeting „the morale of the enemy‟; and three weeks later Essen was the target 
of the first significant British raid of the war.
 99
  Harris in any case felt that in an 
industrial war there was no sensible differentiation between military and civilian, and 
even his bête noire, John Strachey, maintained that the choice was either to bomb cities, 
or prolong the war.
100
  Yet even where civilians may have been targets, „[r]eports on the 
way the German civilians are taking the raids show that the general consequences on 
morale are similar to what they were here.  Bombing leads either to despondent apathy 
or to a hardening of the spirit‟.101   
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Perhaps in the absence of any position on the policy, the notion arose that the 
Party was hostile to Bomber Command.  John Strachey held a wartime temporary 
commission as a Squadron Leader, serving the Directorate of Bomber Operations, and 
reporting on the effects of bombing.
102
  Harris reportedly called on the Air Ministry to 
remove Strachey owing to his political views, and Harris maintained that Strachey had 
influenced Attlee‟s decision not to offer Harris a peerage after the war.103 For his part, 
Attlee was happy to associate himself with Tedder and Portal, but not with Harris, 
whom he blamed for not targeting oil installations, though accepting that „there were 
technical difficulties involved which were only solved later and which I hadn‟t fully 
realised‟.104  While it could be claimed that in the absence of a second front „Bomber 
Command dictated to the German High Command how the German forces should be 
distributed‟,105 Douglas Jay, then one of Dalton‟s civil servants at the Board of Trade, 
complained that the bombing offensive, or at least the production of Lancasters it 
necessitated, meant that there were no decisive results, but the dictation to the 
Government as to how Britain‟s resources should be distributed.106  Dalton was not 
convinced. 
Such public opposition as there was was more limited, and largely limited to the 
Church.  The Archbishop of Canterbury William Temple and the Bishop of Chichester 
George Bell appeared more effective representatives of what should have been the 
concerns of Labour than were those in Labour, Stokes, a staunch Catholic, and Cripps, 
equally devout, excepted.  The Bombing Restriction Committee, whose members 
included Vera Brittain, aroused more indignation than influence – Harris described it as 
„subversion‟ and wanted to limit paper107 – but the Herbert Morrison, Home Secretary 
and the fifth and final Labour member of the War Cabinet from October 1942, refused 
to ban it, and even defended it: „in my judgment if people sincerely hold the view that 
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bombing should be abolished or restricted, I cannot see that it is terrible to say so.‟108  
Similarly he supported Davies.
109
  Morrison had from the outset been far from 
aggressive towards Germany, condemning „foolish and purposeless vindictiveness‟ of 
the 1919 settlement, inviting Vansittart‟s opprobrium.110  Otherwise dissent tended to 
embarrass rather than damage, and was throughout tolerated.  „It seems to me essential 
that we should see beforehand what is going to be said to the troops‟, Churchill told 
Sinclair.  „This rule might be waived in the case of the Archbishop of Canterbury and 
Sir Stafford Cripps‟.111 
Approval was harder to discern, but evident in the absence of public disquiet in 
the national, or the Labour press.
112
 Harris was sensitive to speeches and newspaper 
stories that were critical of Bomber Command the strategy, and duly facilitated the 
cultivation of propaganda, to ensure “a suitable record of achievement”,113 given that 
“the cumulative effect of bombing is what matters”.114  Stories were planted, and 
through aerial photographs could Bomber Command be presented as demonstrably 
effective by authors duly assisted,
115
 and that air power was “the sword of justice”.116  
Throughout the war the prevalent complaint was about escalation and efficiencies.  
When bombing was reported in the Labour press, even bombing of British towns, there 
was little in the way of sensationalism.  Homelessness was presented as an indication of 
effectiveness: in February 1944 it would take only ten more raids „to wipe out Berlin 
completely‟; it was a „city of sleepwalkers … [t]hey have nowhere to go, nothing in 
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which to ride, nothing to see except ruin death and decay.‟117  The first thousand 
bomber raid, of obvious propagandistic as well as destructive value, where the sky over 
Cologne was as „[b]usy as Piccadilly Circus‟ was particularly well received.118  The 
Daily Herald editorialised „[t]he whole nation gains a new sense of power from this 
evidence of its air strength‟, and its repudiation of Goering‟s prediction that British 
bombs would never fall on Germany.
119
  Mass Observation counted that in London in 
February 1944 six out of ten „give unqualified verbal approval of the raids‟.120  The 
public disclosure of the new 12,000lb High Capacity bomb, the „cookie‟, or 
„blockbuster‟, was accompanied by the warning that „it is too terrible to be dropped on 
ordinary targets‟, and that crews had been briefed to return with the bomb if targets 
could not be identified.
121
  These new „block bombs‟ were „reputed to raze a whole area 
in a single blast‟, and the Daily Herald produced confirmatory evidence.122  The 
12,000lb „Tall Boy‟ was unveiled in similar tones of excitement.123  „Wings for Victory 
Week‟ in March 1943 produced the largest crowds since the coronation appearing on 
the streets of London.
124
  It helped that Britain continued to be bombed until two 
months before the German surrender, as if to remind people.
125
  The „rocket bomb‟ had 
as great a psychological effect as it did physical, and the V2 campaign, which ran from 
September 1944 to March 1945, was only made public once all the launch bases had 
been captured.
126
 By then regular reports from liberated concentration camps 
maintained the momentum of the war effort.  Even Stokes had abandoned the cause, 
though he did turn up at Heliopolis, GHQ, Middle East Force, announcing that he had 
escaped „the lunatic asylum called Parliament‟ attacked the government, and enraged a 
General.  „It is scandalous that a M.P. can come out here on private business and talk as 
Mr Stokes did to servicemen‟.127 
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Stokes was still scandalised that Sinclair could speak „almost gloatingly of “the great 
crescendo of destruction”.  I thought what a magnificent expression for a Cabinet 
Minister of Great Britain at this stage of the war.‟128  The culmination of the bombing 
offensive was the culmination of the war, which posed, as it has continued to, many 
causal questions.  „The real effectiveness of our air bombing remains to be checked up 
later on‟, Dalton admitted. „My own view is that it is becoming one of several decisive 
factors, but, like the blockade last time, the results won‟t show clearly till the end is 
reached.‟129  Reports increasingly conveyed the devastation of the built environment, 
but without questioning the policy that had done so or the likely benefits.
130
  In March 
1945, the quantity of British and American bombs dropped on Germany was three times 
the total of those dropped on Britain in the entire war.
131
  That month, the last of the 
war, included what became the emblem of the policy: Dresden.  Churchill, at Yalta, 
confirmed the action, and Attlee, chairing the War Cabinet, approved; the outcome 
amounted to applied Vansittartism, which its creator welcomed.
132
  Different in degree 
rather than in kind (of which its timing was part), there were strategic justifications, but 
Dresden aroused misgivings.
133
  Cecil King, of the Sunday Pictorial, thought it „entirely 
horrifying.  Not only does it make nonsense of all our protestations about our war aims 
and about our bombing policy: it gives official proof for everything that Goebbels has 
said on the subject‟.134  Harris irritatedly explained that he had merely „implementing 
official policy … [w]e have never gone in for terror bombing‟.135  In any case, „[t]he 
news‟, Strauss recalled, „was received by Londoners with satisfaction.  At last, they 
said, we were making our enemies suffer the horrors they are inflicting on us‟.136 
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At the Quebec conference in September 1944, the British and Americans 
determined that the defeat of Japan was likely to be eighteen months after that with 
Germany.
137
 Popular opinion appeared to even less concerned with the laying waste of 
Japanese cities that it was with those of Germany, and a range of geopolitical 
imperatives impelled the British government to be more actively involved in the final 
assault.
138
  Churchill offered Bomber Command, as well as naval and land forces.  For 
much the same reasons as the British were keen – the post-war settlement – were the 
Americans reluctant.  Not only unwanted, and unnecessary, Britain‟s contribution to the 
strategic bombing of Japan was not readily available.  „If all went v. well, 6 months 
before we cd. drop our first bomb on Japan‟ was Sinclair‟s great crescendo in the 
east.
139
  Preparations were made and in July 1945 there were five joint British-American 
raids on Japan.
140
  A month later, and five days after Labour took office, President 
Truman informed Attlee that the Americans were to fulfil the arrangement made with 
Churchill at Potsdam to use atomic weapons against Japan.  Five days later the first was 
dropped.  Hiroshima, „a town like Hull‟, the Herald told its readers.  The raid was „only 
the beginning.  Hundreds more and even more powerful are to follow‟.141  The death toll 
made public was 200,000; „[o]n this basis one raid by 300 planes with atomic bombs 
could disintegrate the whole population of the Japanese main islands‟.142 The second, 
and final, raid on 15 August 1945 included two British observers.
143
  Harris admitted 
that the strategy was exactly what he had been practising on Germany.
144
 
The implications of the bomb brought a widespread moral dimension to 
consideration of strategic bombing really for the first time.  Tribune observed that „Mr 
Churchill is left thanking a merciful providence which withheld this instrument from the 
hands of our enemies‟.145  Citrine highlighted the weapon‟s „indiscriminate nature‟, 
which therefore contradicted stated allied policy; Morgan Philips was concerned lest 
                                                          
137
 WC, 22 September 1944, CAB65/43/41. 
138
 Thomas Hall, „„Mere Drops in the Ocean‟: The Politics and Planning of the Contribution of the 
British Commonwealth to the Final Defeat of Japan, 1944-45‟, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 16 
(2005), 93-115. 
139
 WC, 11 June 1945, CAB/195/3. 
140
 Daily Herald, 19 July 1945, 1. 
141
 Daily Herald, 7 August 1945, 1. 
142
 Daily Herald, 9 August 1945, 1. 
143
 New York Times, 9 September 1945, 1 
144
 Harris to Bottomley, 29 March 1945 [copy], Harris papers, H9. 
145
 Tribune, 10 August 1945, 1. 
The Labour Party and Strategic Bombing in the Second World War 
20 
 
„atomic power should be left to private interests‟; Laski saw it as „unthinkable that the 
discovery should not lead us to see why international government must become the 
basic condition of civilised living‟.146  History had repeated itself, ten years on. The 
very new and specific circumstances after August 1945 emphasised the importance of 
„building a new society‟, as Tribune put it, with „a pre-eminent role … by the new 
Government and the new Britain‟147  „Who owns omnipotence?‟ the New Statesman 
asked.
148
  The Labour government would formally decide to acquire some of it just over 
a year later. Even then, in Cabinet and the Defence Sub Committee, Strauss recalled, 
discussion concerned practicalities.
149
 
 
The issue of strategic bombing in the Second World War as far as the Labour Party was 
concerned, was, as it was for any non-pacifist institution or individual, a matter of 
balance between efficacy and ethics.  With no other dimension of the war were the two 
so at odds, and that was how it remained.  At the time, The New Leader maintained, 
„[t]here is no point in protesting against bombing if we do not protest against war‟.150  
Vera Brittain‟s Seed of Chaos, and the correspondence it had given rise to, had 
particularly irritated George Orwell.  „There is something very distasteful in accepting 
war as an instrument and at the same time wanting to dodge responsibility for its more 
obviously barbarous features‟151  Dalton agreed, with ministerial mien.  „[I]f the 
bombing of German civilians – and, after all, it was quite false to draw a line between a 
soldier in uniform, and a civilian making arms for the soldier or otherwise assisting the 
„war effort‟ – resulted in shortening the war and saving lives of large numbers of British 
soldiers, who would otherwise be slaughtered as on the Somme and Passchendaele in 
the last war, I was all for it.‟152  And yet, although the infamous absence of a campaign 
medal was “entirely due” to Churchill,153 as far as Harris was concerned, it was Attlee 
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“(influenced no doubt by that Left Wing intellectual Strachey and the weak Stansgate) 
who denigrated Bomber Command after the socialists won power.”154 
Insofar as there is any historical consensus, it has settled on the balance between 
strategic bombing being initially Britain‟s only way of waging war against an aggressor, 
and then a significant contributory factor to Britain and its allies prevailing, before 
finally, when the institutional momentum had almost broken free, to an unnecessary and 
excessive scale.  For the Party, bombing was a necessary retaliatory and offensive 
action; quite how it was conducted was a matter for Bomber Command and the Prime 
Minister, and a matter they wished to retain.  Labour men would help provide the 
delivery systems, and select suitable targets, and even eighty per cent of the crews.   
Operational matters were matters for others; as was often the case, the war was 
elsewhere.  The subject was not mentioned in substance in the Party‟s national 
meetings, public and private, nor its press, or by its leading figures.  It was not minuted 
at any meeting of the NEC, nor its International Sub Committee, or the International 
Department Executive Committee.  On bombing, conference said nothing; even Jack 
Blitz, delegate of Portsmouth Borough Labour Party, was silent.
155
 
Institutional insensibility notwithstanding, a „labourist‟ approach to the subject 
can nevertheless be discerned. As horrific as the bombing of Britain was, it was borne; 
perhaps the layperson was unable to comprehend how much greater was the damage 
meted to Germany.  It was rare to read that „there is a unity of suffering among the 
common people of both nations‟.156  In any case, as Attlee told Davies, and has been 
said subsequently, „I suggest that my hon. Friend might turn his attention to those who 
began it.‟157 Yet Jay was worried that it could “be argued that it was we who began the 
bombing of cities and civilian populations.”158  Even when asked „must we kill German 
women and children‟? One Labour paper concluded that no government would sanction 
such an order, nor would any British airman undertake it; „but it is conceivable that 
circumstances might arise where the bombing of civilians might have to be regarded in 
the nature of a regrettable necessity.‟159 
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The subtext to this historical question is whether a progressive, perhaps soi-
disant, internationalist party ought to have served as some sort of conscience of the 
people, as the state church sought to.  The nature of the Party was one thing; the nature 
of the Party in the war was another.  The workers did have a country, disproving Marx, 
but also had a mission.  Out of office for a decade, but feeling its moment nearing, 
Labour was preoccupied with its own operational matters.  During the first Cabinet 
meeting of the new government in August 1945, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief 
of the Imperial General Staff, was questioned by ministers as to the strategic situation, 
observing afterwards „all of them mainly influenced by political as opposed to military 
motives‟.160  Yet insofar as there were military motives, they were consistent with the 
Party‟s values and conduct.  The „national security‟ perspective that had produced a 
muscular position on armaments before the war (and no change in policy when the 
government changed) was more than consistent – was intrinsic – to the Party‟s ambition 
of winning and wielding parliamentary power in the interests of its supporters: the 
strategy was one to make implementing Beveridge possible.  To that extent it was less 
that patriotism had prevailed over class consciousness, than that patriotism was class 
consciousness: winning the war was more important than the Socialist International.  In 
that, the Party could perhaps be said truly to be the tribune of the people.  A month 
before the German surrender, The Daily Herald, the Party‟s official newspaper with a 
readership of over four million, organised an exhibition – in collaboration with the Air 
Ministry – called „To Victory with the RAF‟, and starring a 12,000lb „blockbuster‟.  
Amongst the many exhibits popular with the „many children there … [c]hief interest 
appeared to be in the representation of a raid on a German town.‟161 
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